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CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-ABSENT A
SHOWING OF PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT, DUE PROCESS IS NOT VIOLATED BY PROSECUTOR'S CONTACT WITH
COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE WITNESS IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT PERJURY. United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 913 (1985).
An individual was charged with two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. J After the first day of trial, the prosecutor contacted counsel for a defense witness and advised counsel that if the
witness perjured himself, the witness's pretrial diversion agreement
would be revoked. 2 Counsel for the defense witness discussed the prosecutor's warning with his client and suggested that the client avoid testifying if possible. Prior to the commencement of the second day of trial, the
defense witness sought out the prosecutor, who repeated the warning
against perjury but refused to discuss the matter further. The defense
objected to the prosecutor's warning on the theory that the warning had
intimidated the witness and the trial court heard this evidence out of the
presence of the jury. The trial court concluded that no prejudice to the
defendant had occurred. The witness testified as planned, and the defendant was convicted. 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed, holding that, absent a showing of prejUdice to the defendant, the prosecutor's contact with counsel for a defense witness in an
effort to prevent perjury does not violate the defendant's due process
rights. 4 The court reasoned that the allegedly intimidated witness's testimony pertained to the first count on which the defendant was acquitted;
1. United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378, 379 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.

913 (1985). Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is a federal crime. 18 U.S.C.
App. § 1202(a) (Supp. 1985) provides that "[a]ny person who-(l) has been convicted by a court ... of a felony ... and who receives [or] possesses ... any firearm
... shall be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both." The defendant had been convicted
previously of felonious breaking and entering in 1975 in a North Carolina state
court. Teague, 737 F.2d at 379.
2. Teague, 737 F.2d at 380. "Diversion ... is the disposition of a criminal complaint
without a conviction, the noncriminal disposition being conditioned on either the
performance of specified obligations by the defendant, or his participation in counseling or treatment." R. NIMMER, DIVERSION 5 (1974); see also, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1 U.S. Attorney's Manual § 12 (encourages use of pretrial diversion
agreements). The witness had been the target of an investigation of alleged federal
firearm sales violations. The investigation of the witness had been suspended upon
entry into a diversion agreement with the Department of Justice. It was the cancellation of this agreement that was used to threaten the defendant. Teague, 737 F.2d
at 380.
3. /d.
4. Id. at 384. One of the issues in Teague involved an alleged possession of a firearm
not mentioned in the indictment. The trial court admitted the evidence, having determined that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. Id. at 381. Another
issue was the admission of testimony of a witness under cross examination by the
prosecution relating to several illegal gun sales by the witness to the defendant.
These sales were not the subject of the indictment. This testimony also was considered more probative than prejudicial, and it was held within the discretion of the
court to admit the evidence. Id.
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therefore, no prejudice had occurred. 5 A dissenting judge, in an emphatic
opinion, argued for reversal because the prosecutor's actions were a violation of due process and were harmful to the defendant because the actions interfered with the presentation of witnesses for the defense. 6
The leading case on intimidation of a defense witness is Webb v.
Texas. 7 In Webb, the trial judge gave a lengthy warning against perjury
to a defense witness, implying in his warning that the witness would lie,
be prosecuted for perjury, be convicted, and have his sentence lengthened
beyond that which he already was serving. 8 The witness then refused to
testify. The defendant was convicted, and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed. 9 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the intimidating warning caused the witness such extreme duress that he refused to
testify.1O The Court stated that "the judge's threatening remarks, directed only at the single witness for the defense, effectively drove that
witness off the stand, and thus deprived the petitioner of due process of
law under the Fourteenth Amendment.""
5. Teague, 737 F.2d at 384.
6. Id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see infra note 40 and accompanying text.
7. 409 U.S. 95 (1972). Webb relied in part on Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967),
where the Court reversed a state court conviction because a codefendant was not
allowed to testify on behalf of the defendant. At the time, Texas statutes codified the
common law bar to accomplices testifying for each other. The majority in Washington held that the sixth amendment right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses
favorable to the defense had been violated through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment:
The right to offer testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance,
if necessary, is in plain terms, the right to present a defense, the right to
present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to
the jury so that it may decide where the truth lies.
Washington, 388 U.S. at 19; accord In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (The trial
judge, sitting as a one-man grand jury, sentenced the defendant for contempt without a hearing. The Supreme Court reversed based on the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, stating that "[a] person's right to ... be heard ... [is] basic
in our system of jurisprudence; these rights include . . . a right . . . to offer
testimony. ").
8. 409 U.S. at 98.
9. Webb v. State, 480 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Crim. App.), rev'd, 409 U.S. 95 (1972).
10. Webb, 409 U.S. at 98.
11. Id. The concept of due process is not susceptible to precise definition, but can be
ascertained by a review of the process of judicial "inclusion and exclusion." Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877); see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,27
(1949) ("To rely on a tidy formula for the easy determination of what is a fundamental right ... belittles the scale of the conception of due process. "). In general,
due process is rooted in the notion of fair play. It protects the person from the
arbitrary actions of government. See also Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581 (1819) (argument ofD. Webster) ("The meaning
[of due process] is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the protection of the general rules which govern society."). The roots
of the concept of due process can be traced back through the common law to the
Magna Carta, 1215 A.D. See generally 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 104 (3d ed. reprinted 1966) (noting the "vast influence" of the Magna
Carta as the safeguard of personal liberty in the development of the concept of due
process).
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It is important to note that the state or federal prosecutor in criminal cases has a dual function. The prosecutor has a responsibility not
only to pursue the case zealously, but also to "do justice." 12 It is permissible for the prosecutor to warn a potentially adverse witness of the witness's fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination and
of the witness's sixth amendment right to counsel. 13 In so doing, however, the prosecutor must exercise proper restraint. When it can be
shown that a defense witness refused to testify after an alleged intimidation by an overzealous prosecutor, the conviction must be reversed.
For example, in United States v. Morrison 14 the defense witness was
a codefendant against whom charges had been dropped. The prosecutor,
on three occasions, warned the witness that if she testified, she would be
reindicted. IS The prosecutor also used an invalid subpoena to bring the
witness to his office where he repeated his warnings and advised the witness of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Although she took the stand, the witness refused to testify fully, pleading
the fifth amendment privilege. The defendant was convicted. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed because the witness's failure to testify fully for the defense violated the defendant's due
process right. The court granted a new trial and gave instructions that if
the intimidated witness was called for the defense and invoked her fifth
amendment right not to testify, the defendant was entitled to an acquittal
unless the government granted the witness immunity from use of her
compelled testimony against her.16
Morrison indicates that intimidation of a defense witness by an official other than the trial judge can violate a defendant's due process
12. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 7-13 (1979); see Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1935); State v. Pineau, 463 A.2d 779 (Me. 1983); Commonwealth v. Starks, 479 Pa. 51, 387 A.2d 829 (1978).
13. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 3.2(b) (Approved Draft 1971) ("In interviewing a prospective witness
it is proper but not mandatory for the prosecutor or his investigator to caution the
witness concerning possible self-incrimination and his possible need for counsel.").
14. 535 F.2d 223 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Boscia v. United States, 429 U.S. 824
(1976).
15. Morrison, 535 F.2d at 225 (3rd Cir. 1976); accord Campbell v. State, 37 Md. App.
89, 376 A.2d 866 (1977). In Campbell, the prosecution notified the court that it was
reopening a stet processus to resume prosecution of the defense witness. On appeal,
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the conviction because of prejudicial intimidation of the witness, based on the sixth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution, stating the defendant could not receive a fair trial
without benefit of use immunity for the witness. Campbell, 37 Md. App. at 100-01,
376 A.2d at 872.
16. Morrison, 535 F.2d at 229 (3rd Cir. 1976). See generally, Annot. 4 ALR 4th 617,
621-24 (1981) (except in rare cases, use immunity for defense witnesses is at the sole
discretion of the prosecution); 81 AM. JUR. 2D §§ 58-59 (1976) (witnesses) (noting
that "use and derivative use" immunity, which prevents prosecuting authorities
from making use of a witness's compelled testimony or its derivative fruits, is coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
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rights. Decisions in other circuits also support this viewY In United
States v. Thomas,18 the Sixth Circuit found the actions ofa Secret Service
agent prejudicial to the defendant when, after the agent's threats, a defense witness refused to testify.19 In Thomas, several codefendants were
tried for counterfeiting. Defense counsel called one acquitted defendant
as a witness to testify on behalf of the remaining defendants. In the hallway, a Secret Service agent informed the witness that if he were to testify,
he would be indicted on another charge. Thereafter, the witness refused
to testify. On appeal, the agent's actions were considered a deliberate
attempt to intimidate the witness and were found to represent a substantial interference with the defense. The case was reversed and remanded
for a new trial. 20
The Fifth Circuit read the holdings of Webb, Morrison, and Thomas
to represent a "harmful per se" rule when it decided a case of witness
intimidation in United States v. Hammond. 21 In Hammond, an FBI
agent stopped a defense witness in the hall outside of the courtroom and
warned him that if he continued to testify, he would have "nothing but
trouble" in a related state case in which the witness was a codefendant. 22
The witness refused to continue testifying, and the defendant was convicted. The Fifth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction, finding that
the intimidation of the defense witness was a violation of due process. 23
The court reasoned that the interference with the defense must have been
deliberate and that a per se rule against this type of conduct was the best
deterrent. 24 The court also stated there was no method to determine what
testimony was rendered unavailable by the alleged intimidation. Because
the testimony was made unavailable by a governmental agent, the government deprived the defendant of his right to present a thorough defense. This deprivation was, therefore, "harmful per se."25 Although
17. See, e.g., United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1979) (defense witness
intimidated by an FBI agent); United States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334 (6th Cir.
1973) (defense witness intimidated by statement of Secret Service agent); United
States v. Smith, 478 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (defense witness threatened with
prosecution by Assistant United States Attorney).
18. 488 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1973).
19. Id. at 335.
20. Id. at 336.
21. 598 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1979).
22. Id. at 1012.
23. Id. at 1013.
24.Id.
25. Id.; see also United States v. Henricksen, 564 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(As part of a plea bargain, witness agreed not to testify for or against defendant. On
appeal, the government confessed error and the court reversed, holding that the
government's actions were a violation of due process.). Compare People v. Callington, 123 Mich. App. 301, 333 N.W.2d 260 (1983) (court surveyed state intimidation cases, determining that no per se rule was discernible; state courts use a case
by case approach, reversing when prejudice to the defense is found) (case reversed
based on sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution) with
People v. Daly, 98 App. Div. 2d 803, 807-08,470 N.Y.S.2d 165, 170-71 (1983)
(Lazer, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of a harmful per se rule when a defense
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the failure of the defense witness to testify is an important factor in the
due process analysis, it is not always determinative. 26 In United States v.
Valdes,27 the evidence showed that the only contact between the prosecutor and the witness was in the presence of the defense counsel and that
only one warning against perjury was given. 28 After consulting with defense counsel, the witness refused to testify, invoking the fifth amendment privilege. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, implicitly
finding no intimidation and no prejudice on these facts. 29
Prior to its decision in United States v. Teague,30 the Fourth Circuit
in United States v. MacCIoskey31 had the opportunity to review the alleged intimidation of a defense witness. Although MacCioskey was decided in part on other grounds, the court took special note of actions of
the government that can lead to a defense witness's refusal to testify.32
In MacCloskey, an indicted codefendant planned to give exculpatory
testimony for the defendant. Prior to trial, the prosecutor advised defense
counsel that charges against the codefendant witness would be dropped.
After trial began, however, the prosecutor called the codefendant witness's attorney and advised that if the codefendant testified and incriminated herself, she would be reindicted. 33 On the fourth day of trial, the
codefendant's risk of self-incrimination and her alleged intimidation by
the prosecutor were brought before the court. 34 The court held a voir
dire examination of the codefendant out of the jury's presence. Her testimony exonerated both herself and the defendant; the charges against her
then were dropped. 35 Nonetheless, when called to testify later in the trial,
witness is intimidated through judicial or prosecutorial misconduct based on the
sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution).
26. One court of appeals's decision suggests that intimidation may not be reversible
error where the favorable testimony would have been cumulative in relation to other
testimony on the record. Thus, even if the trial court denied the defendant the
favorable testimony, no prejudice would occur. United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d
314,330-32 (8th Cir. 1978); see also People v. Robinson, 144 Cal. App. 3d 962, 193
Cal. Rptr. 92 (1983) (in response to multiple warnings against perjury, the witness
refused to testify; the appellate court found that the testimony would have been
cumulative, and therefore no reversible error had occurred).
27. 545 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1977).
28. Id. at 960.
29. Id. at 959-60. The court also noted defense counsel's failure to place the issue of
intimidation squarely before the trial court and failure to include an affidavit necessary to perfect the appeal. Id.
In contrast to the holding of Valdes is United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d
1008 (5th Cir. 1979), decided two years later. In Hammond, a more egregious case
of intimidation, the Fifth Circuit developed a "harmful per se" rule regarding the
prosecution's interference with the presentation of the defense. 598 F.2d at 1013; see
supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
30. United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 913
(1985).
31. 682 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1982).
32. Id. at 479.
33. Id. at 475.
34.Id.
35.Id.
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the now former codefendant invoked her fifth amendment privilege when
asked certain questions. 36 On appeal, the court expressed "serious
doubts" regarding the propriety of the prosecutor's contacts with the former codefendant's counsel. The government conceded that the contact
was "ill-advised and possibly improper."37 The court condemned the
prosecutor's actions that had interfered with the presentation of the defense and reversed the defendant's conviction. 38
In United States v. Teague,39 the Fourth Circuit held that absent a
showing of prejudice to the defendant, such as refusal of a defense witness to testify fully, due process is not violated by a prosecutor's contact
with counsel for a defense witness in an effort to prevent perjury.40 The
court noted, however, that the prosecutor's actions were "dangerous and
foolish," because the contact and warnings to the defense witness were a
potential violation of due process and could have prejudiced the defendant's case. 41
The court's holding was based on three factors. First, the witness
testified as planned by the defense. The court noted that in intimidation
cases where convictions were reversed, the defendant somehow has been
denied the witness's testimony.42 In Teague, the court found that the defense witness did not invoke the fifth amendment privilege43 and testified
without alteration, despite the alleged threats of the prosecutor. 44
Second, the witness presented no exculpatory testimony as to count
one of the indictment, the count on which the defendant was convicted. 45
The witness had not been present at the time of the arrest that was the
basis of count one. 46 The court stated that the alleged intimidated witness
"could not help ... or hurt [the defendant] on the issue of knowingly
having possession [of the firearm]. " "47
36.Id.
37. Id. at 479.
38.Id.
39. 737 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 913 (1985).
40. Id. at 384.
41. Id. at 382. In Teague, the dissent would hold that the prosecutor's actions were not
harmless. /d. at 384-86 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the
case against the defendant was not "overwhelming" and that the credibility of the
witness allegedly intimidated was crucial to the defense. Thus, the dissent reasoned
the accused's presentation of his defense may have been prejudiced especially in
light of the witness's "nervous and scared" demeanor when testifying. The prosecutor's aggressive stance against the witness should therefore rise to harmful error. Id.
at 384-86.
42. Id. at 384.
43. 737 F.2d at 384; cf United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 475-76 (4th Cir.
1982) (A defense witness refused to testify after threat of reindictment by the prosecutor. The court held the defendants' due process rights had been violated.).
44. 737 F.2d at 384.
45. Id. Count one involved Teague's arrest on January 31,1979 while in possession ofa
firearm. Id. at 380. Teague was acquitted as to count two, a possession of firearms
charge, alleged to have occurred on May 21, 1979. Id. at 380-81.
46. /d. at 381, 384.
47. Id. at 381.
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Third, the alleged intimidating contact occurred between the prosecutor and the witness's counsel rather than between the prosecutor and
the witness himself. The court rejected a per se rule prohibiting "any
contact between the prosecutor and an attorney for a witness made in an
effort to prevent perjury .... "48
The dissent argued in favor of reversal in Teague 49 based on three
facts: interference by the prosecutor with a defense witness; evidence on
the record indicating a negative effect on the witness's demeanor; and the
absence of an overwhelming case against the defendant. 50 For the dissent, these facts combined to result in error which was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 51
Teague is consistent with decisions that do not apply a "harmful per
se" rule to allegations of defense witness intimidation. 52 The Teague
court also followed previous decisions that criticize governmental conduct that allegedly intimidates a defense witness. 53 Although the question of how to discipline the overreaching prosecutor has not fully been
decided, the Supreme Court in United States v. Hasting 54 has offered suggestions. In Hasting, three alternative disciplinary measures were set out:
the trial court could order the prosecutor to show cause why he should
48. Id. at 384.
49. Id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 385-86 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 386-87 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The dissent based its constitutional harmless error analysis on Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), and United States
v. Hasting, 103 S. Ct. 1974 (1983), and found that the prosecutor's error was harmful to the defense. Both Chapman and Hasting, however, involved a prosecutor's
comments on the defendant's failure to testify, but also stand for the general proposition that certain federal constitutional deprivations do not warrant reversal unless
it can be shown that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The
majority in Teague does not specifically address this issue.
52. See, e.g., United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 479 (4th Cir. 1982) (court uses
a constitutional analysis to find error and avoids a "harmful per se" rule); United
States v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365,368-72 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (court analyzed the record at length, concluding that the record was insufficient to support a claim of intimidation), affd on reh'g after remand, 699 F.2d 1250 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 121 (1983); United States v. Valdes, 545 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1977) (under
careful analysis, facts did not rise to prejudicial intimidation); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 228 (3d Cir.) (court used a constitutional, harmless error analysis to find a violation of due process but did not use the phrase "harmful per se"),
cert. denied sub nom. Boscia v. United States, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); United States v.
Thomas, 488 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1973) (analysis revealed that the misconduct of the
government resulted in prejudicial inference when the intimidated witness failed to
testify); cf United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1979) (intimidation
of defense witness by FBI agent was per se harmful error warranting reversal).
53. See United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 475 (4th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd on reh'g after remand, 699
F.2d 1250 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 121 (1983); United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 224
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Boscia v. United States, 429 U.S. 824 (1976);
United States v. Smith, 478 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Thomas,
488 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1973).
54. 103 S.Ct. 1974 (1983).

396

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 15

not be disciplined by the court; the trial court could ask the Department
of Justice or an equivalent state agency to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the prosecutor; or the court could identify publicly and chastise the prosecutor in its opinion. 55
The Teague court chose to discipline the prosecutor by naming the
prosecutor in the opinion and declaring the prosecutor's actions foolish
and dangerous. 56 This is the least imposing of the three disciplinary
measures set out in Hasting,57 and it is questionable how effective this
method will be in discouraging prosecutorial overreaching. The first two
options place a prosecutor's career in immediate jeopardy. Naming the
prosecutor is embarrassing and may harm the prosecutor's career, but it
attaches less immediate jeopardy to the prosecutor. Cases indicate that
prosecutorial overreaching is recurrent in the courts,58 despite instances
of public chastisement of the prosecutor in order to effect discipline. 59
The Teague court did go further by condemning the prosecutor's actions
as dangerous and foolish. 60 Hence, the Fourth Circuit cautioned prosecutors not to overreach when warning a defense witness about the penalties
for perjured testimony.
In rejecting a per se rule prohibiting any contact between a prosecutor and an attorney for a witness,61 the Teague court implies that if the
contact were between a prosecutor and a witness without counsel the
result might be different. This implication is tenuous, however, because
the facts of the case demonstrate that there also were direct contacts between the prosecutor and the witness. 62 The court acknowledged this
55. Id. at 1979 n.5. Hasting involved a prosecutor's comment on the silence of the defendant and the failure of the defendant to rebut certain testimony. The Court found
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the "overwhelming" record of evidence against the defendant. Id. at 1982.
56. United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378, 382 (4th Cir. 1984).
57. 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1979 n.5 (1983).
58. See United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 475 (4th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Hammond, 598
F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 224 (3d
Cir. 1976); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1935); United States
v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631,662 (1946) (Frank, J., dissenting) ("If this
court really meant business about such behavior as that of government counsel ... ,
it would deprive him of the right to practice in this court and would recommend
that he be removed from his office.... ").
59. See United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468,475 (4th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Hammond, 598
F.2d 1008, IOlO (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 224 (3d
Cir. 1976).
60. United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378,382 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
913 (1985).
61. Id. at 384.
62. There were at least two confrontations between the prosecutor and the witness.
They met once in the hall before the trial resumed on the second day and again
when the witness took the stand under cross examination. In addition, prior to
Teague's trial the witness himself had been the target of an investigation. Teague,
737 F.2d at 380, 386 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); cf J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN

1986]

United States v. Teague

397

problem through an analysis of other intimidation cases,63 but limited
the scope of the holding to the narrow, factual question of whether the
witness testified for the defense. 64 A fortiori, the court was content to
dispose of the issue of a due process violation based on the witness's testifying. In any event, the testimony the witness gave was not exculpatory
as to count one, the count on which the conviction was obtained. 65
Teague requires the prosecutor to walk a fine line when dealing with
defense witnesses. When interviewing a prospective witness, it is proper
for the prosecutor to warn a witness against self-incrimination. 66 In addition, the prosecutor has a dual responsibility, not only to prosecute zealously, but "to do justice."67 Thus, the prosecutor is faced with a
dilemma. The prosecutor may warn against perjury, but runs the risk of
prejudicing the defendant's case if the prosecutor is overzealous and intimidates the witness. The more aggressive and outrageous the conduct
of the prosecutor, the more scrutiny the conduct will receive. 68 Hence,
admonitions regarding perjury preferably are left to the court. 69

63.
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.

69.

TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 781 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (giving several illustrations
where a witness is abused under examination, rendering his testimony suspect).
Teague, 737 F.2d at 382-84.
[d. at 382 n.!.
[d. at 384. But see Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (although it was unlikely that
the intimidated witness's testimony would have been exculpatory because the witness was an inmate at the time of the alleged crime and was not at the scene, the
trial court's actions that prevented the witness from testifying for the defense were
considered a violation of the defendant's fourteenth amendment right to due process
of law).
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
Compare Teague, 737 F.2d at 380 (prosecutor advised attorney for witness that his
client's pretrial diversion agreement would be revoked if the witness committed perjury) and United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1982) (prosecutor
advised attorney for witness that if the witness incriminated herself on the stand, she
would be reindicted), with United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976)
(Prosecutor's contact with the witness included several ex parte interviews, one of
which was held under aegis of an invalid subpoena. In all contacts, the prosecutor
advised of the dangers of testifying and that if the witness testified, her testimony
would be used as evidence against her.), cert. denied sub nom. Boscia v. United
States, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); see also State v. Huffman, 65 Or. App. 594, 672 P.2d
1351 (1983) (prosecutor's conduct must be outrageous before court will order a reversal, citing as an example Campbell v. State, 37 Md. App. 89, 376 A.2d 866 (1977)
(as trial began, prosecutor notified the court that he was reopening a case against the
defense witness on related charges; conviction reversed because prosecutor's actions
impermissibly infringed on defendant's rights under the sixth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution».
United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d at 387 (4th Cir. 1984) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); accord United States v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United
States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 1976); see also State v. Koller, 87
Wis. 2d 253, 274 N.W.2d 651 (1979) (where there had been no ex parte communication with the witness and the judge had given a single instruction on the witness's
fifth amendment rights, there was no prejUdice to the defendant when the witness
refused to testify); People v. Callington, 123 Mich. App. 301, 304, 333 N.W.2d 260,
263 (1983) (if prosecutor feels that a warning against perjury is needed, he should so
inform the court out of the presence of the witness, leaving the warning to the dis-
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Any change in the demeanor of a witness may evidence intimidation.70 It is true that witnesses are often nervous and frightened under
cross examination; vigorous confrontation is a necessary part of the adversary system of jurisprudence. But when the witness's poor demeanor
has been preceded by an openly aggressive extra-judicial stance by the
prosecutor against that witness, and when the witness's testimony goes to
the count on which the conviction is obtained, a change in the witness's
demeanor should not be dismissed casually.71 Intimidation also can be
shown by a change in the witness's testimony effected by the prosecutor's
intimidating acts, 72or more commonly, by a refusal of the witness to testify after contact with the prosecutor. 73 Defense counsel must be sensitive
to the issue of intimidation and must respond quickly.74 In Teague, defense counsel was successful in having the intimidated witness describe
his postintimidation mental state at trial under oath. The witness told the
trial judge that he knew "the bind [he was] in testifying up here."75 At
oral argument, defense counsel described the witness's demeanor and delivery as "nervous and scared."76 These notations in the record provided
grounds for the argument that the prosecutor's actions had violated the
defendant's due process rights. 77 In contrast, many reported cases show
the defense counsel's failure to preserve the intimidation issue for appeaP8 by failing to have the witness take the stand and refuse to testify
for the record. 79 The misconduct of the prosecutor, and its degree of
cretion of the court; conviction reversed because a perjury warning to the witness
impermissibly infringed on defendant's rights under the sixth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution.).
70. United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378, 384-87 (4th Cir. 1984) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 46.
71. Teague, 737 F.2d at 387.
72. Cf Clark v. State, 180 Ind. App. 472, 389 N.E.2d 712 (1979) (during recess, prosecutor spoke to defense witness to rectify inconsistent prior testimony; although witness subsequently changed his testimony, the court held there was no prejudice
absent a showing of coercion on the record).
73. Teague, 737 F.2d at 382 n.1.
74. Defense counsel asked for a hearing on the day the alleged intimidation came to
light. Teague, 737 F.2d at 380. The alleged intimidation had taken place that morning and the prior evening. Id.
75. Id. at 385-86 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
76.Id.
77. Compare Teague, 737 F.2d 378, 382-84 (witness implicitly held not to be intimidated because he testified for the defendant) with United States v. Simmons, 670
F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (defendant must show "substantial prejudice" on the record to obtain a reversal of conviction on grounds that the prosecutor
deprived him of defense testimony by threatening a witness), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
121 (1983) and United States v. Valdes, 545 F.2d 957, 959 (5th Cir. 1977) (appeal
grounded almost entirely on an affidavit that was not part of the formal record).
78. Teague, 737 F.2d at 384-88 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) arguing that the facts on the
record regarding intimidation, when considered on balance with the "less than overwhelming" case against the defendant, should be considered a prejudicial violation
of due process of law).
79. See, e.g., People v. McKiness, 105 Ill. App. 3d 92, 433 N.E.2d 1146 (1982) (counsel
did not call the allegedly intimidated witness to the stand, thereby failing to place
the issue on the record).
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impropriety shown clearly on the record, will be dispositive of whether
the defendant's due process rights to a fair trial have been violated. 80
Dennis Patrick McGlone

80. Teague, 737 F.2d at 384; see United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872
(1982); see also State v. Ivy, 300 N.W.2d 310, 314 (Iowa 1981) ("It is not misconduct that gives the defendant a right to relief, it is the prejudice which results therefrom."). But see United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378, 384 (4th Cir. 1984)
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the record showed intimidation and interference warranting reversal); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d
631,661 (1946) (Frank, J., dissenting) (urging that the prosecutor's outrageous conduct was cause for removal of prosecutor from office and for reversal of defendant's
conviction); People v. Daly, 98 App. Div. 2d 803, 807-08, 470 N.Y.S.2d 165, 170
(1983) (Lazer, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of a per se harmful error rule based
on the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution whenever
a defense witness is intimidated through judicial or prosecutorial misconduct).

